The Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business Bias by Conrad, Robin S.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 49 | Number 4 Article 4
1-1-2009
The Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business
Bias
Robin S. Conrad
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Robin S. Conrad, The Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business Bias, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 997 (2009).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol49/iss4/4
THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE MYTH OF A
PRO-BUSINESS BIAS
Robin S. Conrad*
I. INTRODUCTION
Considerable ink has been spilled over the last two years
about the Roberts Court and its business docket. The Santa
Clara Law Review Symposium, "The Roberts Court and Big
Business," has gathered together academics and court
watchers from a broad spectrum to develop a better picture of
the Roberts Court's treatment of business cases. I hope to
contribute my perspective as a practitioner. As head of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce's public policy law firm, I have
participated in and observed the Roberts Court as it has
handed down its early business opinions. In this essay I will
(1) describe the emerging myth that the Roberts Court is
biased in favor of business interests,1 (2) analyze critically the
common elements of the pro-business myth,2 and (3) argue
that the recent business victories are the byproduct of the
Justices' and business community's shared preferences for
uniformity over conflicting legal regimes and for predictable
laws and regulations.
* Robin S. Conrad is executive vice-president of the National Chamber
Litigation Center ("NCLC"). NCLC is the public policy law firm of the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States. The U.S. Chamber is the country's largest
business federation, with an underlying membership of more than three million
businesses, professional organizations, and state and local chambers of
commerce. The Chamber's membership extends from Main Street to Wall
Street. It includes both small businesses and large companies in every industry
sector, from every region of the country. About ninety-six percent of the
Chamber's members are small businesses with one hundred or fewer employees,
and seventy percent of the Chamber's small business members have ten or
fewer employees. The Chamber represents its members on Capitol Hill, before
the Executive Branch and regulatory agencies, and in the courts on issues of
national concern to the business community.
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part IV.
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II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE POPULAR MYTH OF A
PRO-BUSINESS ROBERTS COURT
At least up until the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Wyeth v. Levine,4 much of the media coverage of the Roberts
Court's business cases has fostered a popular myth that the
Court is biased in favor of business interests.' Leading
4. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (holding that the Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Act did not preempt a common law failure to warn lawsuit
against a drug manufacturer that included an FDA-approved warning on the
anti-nausea drug in question).
5. See, e.g., A Punitive Ruling: Supreme Court Strayed When it Reduced
Punitive Damages Paid to Exxon Valdez Oil-Spill Victims, HOUS. CHRON., June
30, 2008, at B6 ("Yet again ... the court has sided with big business."); A
Victory for Workers: The Supreme Court Allows Employees to Sue Their
Retirement Plans, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2008, at A14 ("The Supreme Court
during recent terms has relied on cramped legal analysis to deny fairness to
workers .... Yesterday, the justices issued a decision remarkable for the fact
that it was unanimous in handing victory to the proverbial 'little guy.' "); Alan
W. Bock, Supreme Court Moves to the Right, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 15,
2007, at 1 (claiming the Court "showed a fairly strong pro-business tilt" in its
2006 term business cases); Fanny Carrier, Workers' Rights Boosted by the U.S.
Supreme Court, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 25, 2008 ("The US Supreme
Court this year made a number of key rulings on workplace discrimination
which, unusually for the conservative court, mostly favored workers over their
bosses."); Michael Doyle, Businesses Favored in Fraud Case: High Court Leans
Toward Restraining Investors' Ability to Sue Third Parties, FRESNO BEE, Oct.
10, 2007, at C1 ("Roberts joined Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and
Samuel Alito Jr. in revealing pronounced pro-business sympathies Tuesday.");
Michael Doyle, Business Tops High Court's To-Do List, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct.
4, 2008, at B7 ("A business-friendly Supreme Court will start another season
Monday on familiar turf."); Linda Greenhouse, Justices, in Bias Case, Rule for
Older Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at A15 ("[The Court's decision in
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory] was little short of astonishing,
given how far the Court had appeared to be tilting toward business under Chief
Justice John Roberts Jr."); Tory Newmyer, Congress Targets Court's Pro-Biz
Rulings, ROLL CALL, July 7, 2008 ("Congressional Democrats are turning their
attention to a more entrenched foe: an increasingly business-friendly Supreme
Court."); Helen Thomas, High Court Takes Giant Steps Backward, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 5, 2007, at B6 (the Roberts Court "showed a pro-
business and anti-consumer slant"); Senator Charles E. Schumer, Keynote
Address to the American Constitution Society (July 27, 2007) (transcript
available at http://schumer.senate.gov/new.website/record.cfm?id=280107) ("At
their confirmation hearings, both Roberts and Alito presented themselves as
fair and compassionate .... Yet the decisions this term were especially cruel,
advancing the traditional conservative preferences for the government over
criminal defendants and the interests of business over consumers and
employees."); Marcia Coyle, In Review of High Court Term, Justice Kennedy
Still the Man in the Middle, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 8, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202423612323 ("The Roberts Court
continues to be a pro-business, pro-employer court."); James Vicini, Top Court
Sides with Business in Key Cases, REUTERS, July 2, 2008,
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newspapers have accused the Court of playing favorites-a
March 2008 New York Times editorial, for example, described
the Roberts Court as having "a knee-jerk inclination to rule
for corporations over workers and consumers."6 Partisan
commentators take advantage of the mainstream media to
peddle baseless accusations of bias, such as when the head of
the U.S. Public Interest Research Group claimed that the
Roberts Court "looks at big companies as its clients, rather
than the citizens of the United States."7  Even some
academics have entered the fray: in the May 2008 issue of
Trial Magazine, a magazine produced by the American
Association of Justice (formerly the American Trial Lawyer's
Association), law school professor Erwin Chemerinsky
described the Roberts Court as "willing[] to . . . help
businesses at the expense of injured people."' These are only
three examples of numerous reports or articles that have
alleged that the Roberts Court suffers from a pro-business
tilt.
Purveyors of the pro-business myth would have
Americans believe that the Roberts Court is willing to
sacrifice impartiality and fairness-hallmarks of the
American justice system-in order to advance the special
interests of the business community. The alleged victims of
the Roberts Court's business bias are primarily consumers
and workers. This unfortunate narrative account of the
http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSN0236698320080702 ("The
U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has carved out a
reputation for pro-business rulings in a series of important decisions .... Legal
experts said there has been a greater pro-business tilt in the past several terms
under Roberts."); Brian Wingfield, Supreme Court Favors Business, Again,
FORBES, June 19, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/19/unions-supreme-
court-business-cxbw_0619biglabor.html ("[The Roberts Court] has developed
the reputation of being pro-business.").
6. A Verdict for Workers, for a Change, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at 10; see
also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV.
947 (2008) (describing the Roberts Court as "favor[ing] . . .business interests
over those of employees and consumers" and that "this is the most conservative
Court since the mid-1930s.").
7. Christopher S. Rugaber, Divided High Court Solidly Pro-Business,
STAR-LEDGER, (Newark, N.J.) July 2, 2007, at 22, available at 2007 WLNR
12482887 (emphasis added).
8. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Trend in Preemption Rulings, TRIAL,
May, 2008, at 62, 62 ("[Riegel is] a powerful, troubling example of the Court's
willingness to find preemption and help businesses at the expense of injured
people. Riegel will make it more difficult to bring suits for injuries caused by
FDA-approved medical devices.").
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Roberts Court is both inaccurate and harmful to the
reputation of the Court.
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE
PRO-BUSINESS MYTH
The pro-business myth tends to involve any or all of three
basic elements: first, that the Roberts Court's bias in favor of
business interests is evident from the Court's apparent
increased interest in business cases; second, that the business
community's high number of victories during the Roberts
Court proves that the Court prefers business interests over
those of workers and consumers; and finally, that business
parties in Supreme Court cases are benefitting from the
Roberts Court's alleged rightward shift following the
additions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
Although all three elements are premised on kernels of fact,
none proves that the Roberts Court favors business interests
at the expense of impartiality and fairness.
A. The Number of Business-Related Cases on the Roberts
Court Docket Does Not Prove That the Court Is Biased in
Favor of Businesses
Some commentators have suggested that the Roberts
Court is hearing more cases of interest to the business
community than did its predecessor, the Rehnquist Court.9 A
close examination of the dockets of the Roberts Court and the
Natural Rehnquist Court (the period when the Court
experienced no turnover, from the 1994 Term through the
2004 Term) reveals that while there is some truth to the
claim that the Roberts Court is hearing more business cases
(at least as a percentage of the docket), any uptick in business
cases is modest, and claims of a significant shift toward
business cases are clearly overstated.
1. The Perceived Increase in the Number of Business-
Related Cases on the Docket
The Roberts Court does not appear to be hearing a
greater number of business cases in absolute terms than did
the Rehnquist Court, nor is it clear that there has been a
9. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008,
§ MM (Magazine), at 38.
[Vo1:491000
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significant increase in the percentage of the docket that is
business-related. The Chamber of Commerce surveyed all
Supreme Court decisions from the 1994 term-the beginning
of the Natural Rehnquist Court-through the 2007 term to
identify business-related cases. Defining what is or is not a
business case is a murky task.10 The Chamber classified a
case as "business-related" if at least one party was a business,
or the business community was very interested in the
outcome of a case even though neither party was a business.
The latter category of cases, though somewhat amorphous
and subjective, sweeps into the definition of business-related
cases those that otherwise would not be included but are of
considerable concern to the business community. Examples
of such cases include Federal Election Commission v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.," which affected the political
speech rights of trade associations; Massachusetts v. EPA, 2
where trade associations intervened as parties to defend the
EPA's decision that greenhouse gases are not subject to
regulation under the Clean Air Act; and Crawford v.
Metropolitan Government," a Title VII lawsuit against a city
government, which determined the scope of Title Vii's anti-
retaliation provisions.
Despite the popular perception of business cases cresting
during the Roberts Court, in fact an average thirty-eight
percent of the Natural Rehnquist Court's docket consisted of
business-related cases, as compared to forty-three percent of
the Roberts Court's docket. The 2002 Term far exceeded both
the number and percentage of business-related cases of any
individual term under the new Roberts Court, with thirty-
nine business-related cases representing fifty-three percent of
the docket.
10. See, e.g., Jonathan Adler, Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to
Erwin Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 983 (2008) (describing the inherent
problems in identifying which cases are business-related, and the resulting
different numbers of business cases). Many Court watchers have found the
Chamber's docket a useful proxy for how the Court treats business interests.
However, the Chamber does not participate in all business cases. Court
watchers likely rely on the Chamber's record as a convenient 'stand-in" for the
Court's business docket precisely because identifying business-related cases can
be problematic.
11. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
12. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
13. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
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Table 1. Business-related Supreme Court Cases during the Roberts
Court and Natural Rehnquist Court
No. of Business No. of Decisions Percent of
Term Decisions After Argument Docket (%)
Roberts
2007 32 71 45
2006 31 68 46
2005 28 71 39
Rehnquist
2004 29 76 38
2003 26 74 35
2002 39 73 53
2001 34 76 45
2000 26 79 33
1999 21 74 28
1998 38 78 49
1997 28 92 30
1996 23 81 28
1995 35 77 45
1994 32 84 38
2. Alternative Explanations for the Perception of a
Business-Heavy Supreme Court Docket
It is unclear what is responsible for the erroneous
"conventional wisdom" that the Roberts Court is hearing
more business cases than the Rehnquist Court. It is possible
that the misleading perception of a business-heavy docket is a
consequence of the Court's overall shrinking docket. 14
Perhaps Court watchers are more keenly aware of the
business cases that take up the Court's scarce docket
resources.
Even if the recent, modest bump in the percentage of the
docket dedicated to business cases is the result of a conscious
effort by the Roberts Court to hear more business cases, the
move need not be motivated by an agenda to advance
business interests. It is possible that Chief Justice Roberts is
leading the Court to dedicate a higher percentage of the
14. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts,
Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: S. Hrg. 109-158 Before the S. Comm.
of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 333-37 (2005). Responding to a question, then-
nominee John G. Roberts said "there is room for the Court to take more cases.
They hear about half the number of cases they did 25 years ago." Id.
1002 [Vo1:49
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docket to business cases because business cases garner wider
agreement among the Justices. Both Kenneth Starr15 and
Judge Richard Posner 16 have long urged the Court to hear
more business cases because business cases are less
controversial than the social and cultural issues that continue
to divide the Court. Hearing more business cases could help
the Chief Justice advance his goal to foster more consensus
among the Justices.17
Another possibility is that the perceived increase in
business cases is due to a shift in the type of business cases
that the Roberts Court is willing to entertain. For example,
Professor Jeffrey Rosen of The George Washington University
Law School observed that the Roberts Court heard seven
antitrust cases in its first two terms, whereas the Rehnquist
Court heard fewer than one antitrust case a year from 1988
until 2003."
The perception that the Roberts Court is taking more
business cases may reflect that the Court is taking a class of
cases of particular concern to well-connected segments of the
trial bar: those cases tackling the problem of lawyer-driven
litigation or regulation by litigation. The Chamber has
consistently campaigned through amicus briefs at the
certiorari stage for the Court to address the rising costs of
litigation, caused by rules that permit meritless claims to
proceed. Professor Richard Lazarus of Georgetown
University Law Center has suggested that the Court
eventually agreed to hear punitive damages cases in part due
to the Chamber's efforts "over time to draw a picture for the
Justices of a state tort system out of control."19 In addition to
the punitive damages context, the Court appears to be
responding to the Chamber's efforts at the certiorari stage to
15. Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court Gets Down to Business: The
Business Cases, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 599 (2007).
16. Id. at 600 (citing Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term:
Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 67 (2005)).
17. See, e.g., Mark Sherman, Roberts Touts Unanimity on Supreme Court,
WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contentlarticle/2006/1117/AR2006111700999.html ("Roberts has repeatedly
said since his nomination to the court last year that he would prefer to avoid
narrowly divided votes.").
18. Rosen, supra note 9.
19. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487,
1535 (2008).
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educate the Court about the "out of control" litigation costs in
securities and antitrust law.
For example, in its brief in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, urging the Court to consider the pleading
standards in antitrust litigation, the Chamber argued that
"[a]llowing plaintiffs to proceed past the pleading stage,
without any indication that they have evidence or a theory on
which they could actually prevail, will coerce blackmail
settlements of meritless cases."" Justice David Souter
echoed the Chamber's concerns in his majority opinion,
explaining that weak pleading standards allow plaintiffs with
"largely groundless claims" to waste people's time and to use
the threat of "costly and protracted discovery" to scare
defendants into higher settlements.21
The Court expressed similar concerns over "frivolous"
litigation in the securities litigation case Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.22 The Chamber's amicus brief
supporting certiorari in Tellabs argued that the historical
background of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA") demands that the statute be construed so as to
"curb" coercive, meritless claims.25 In her majority opinion in
Tellabs, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressly relied on the
PSLRA's historical record to conclude that the Act must be
interpreted in a manner that would "curb frivolous, lawyer-
driven litigation."24
If the Court is dedicating more of its docket to business
cases because it is taking seriously the business community's
concerns regarding the steep costs of meritless litigation, then
the change is welcome. The Court has, at times, left business
law issues to languish in the circuit courts,25 creating
20. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
(No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 901172.
21. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.
22. Tellabs, Inc. V. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 127 S. Ct.
2499 (2007).
23. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308 (No. 06-484), 2006 WL
3608188.
24. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509.
25. Starr, supra note 15, at 600 ("Especially with the retirement in the early
1990s of two leading members of what I considered and applauded as circuit
conflict police officers-Justice Byron White and Justice Harry Blackmun-few,
if any, voices on the Court claimed they ought to be ... taking more seriously
1004 [Vo1:49
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confusion that fosters more litigation. Professor Lazarus
went so far as to suggest that, under Chief Justice
Rehnquist's watch, the Court was biased against hearing
business cases.26 I would suggest that a modest increased
interest in resolving these issues is a welcome course
correction, rather than proof that the Court is in the pocket of
"big business."
B. The Chamber's Recent Successes Are Not Proof of Pro-
Business Favoritism
Some have claimed that the Chamber's recent high
profile victories prove that the Court decides business cases
in a "knee-jerk" fashion in favor of business interests. 27 The
claim rests on shaky ground-not only is it based on a very
small sample of cases, but it also fails to account for the
Chamber's recent high profile defeats.
Despite a few high-profile victories for employers, such as
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire,2 a broader analysis of the Court's
employment cases shows that the Roberts Court has defied
the "pro-employer" label.29  During the 2007 Term, the
Chamber clearly lost five out of seven of its labor and
employment cases,30 prevailed in a single labor case, 31 and the
the responsibility to eliminate the instability flowing from unresolved conflicts
that were infecting the vast body of federal law.").
26. Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1497. However, Professor Lazarus and I are
in disagreement over his suggestion that the Court has "overcorrected" for this
deficiency.
27. A Verdict for Workers, for a Change, supra note 6.
28. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
29. Daniel J. Davis, Debunking the Myth of a Pro-Employer
Supreme Court, 9 ENGAGE 86, 86-90 (2008), http://www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20090107-DavisEngage93.pdf.
30. The Chamber's defeats included LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs.,
128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008) (deciding that ERISA permits an individual participant
in a 401K plan to bring an action to recover money losses attributable to a
breach of fiduciary duty by plan managers or administrators); Fed. Express
Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008) (concluding that an EEOC intake
questionnaire can serve as a charge of discrimination under the ADEA); CBOCS
W., Inc v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008) (holding that employees can sue for
retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Metlife v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 1117 (2008)
(holding that a conflict of interest by a disability benefit plan administrator
should be weighed on judicial review of the administrator's denial of benefits);
and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008) (holding that
disparate impact analysis under ADEA requires plaintiffs to bear the burden of
persuasion on "reasonable factors other than age" defense).
31. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008) (holding that
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Chamber considered one employment case a "draw."32
Employees, not employers, made a near clean sweep in the
labor and employment cases during the 2007 Term.
Moreover, the Roberts Court decided four consecutive anti-
retaliation cases against employers, including a case on the
2008 Term docket.13 Based on the Roberts Court's meager
record of employment cases, it might be tempting to
characterize the Court as pro-employee/anti-employer. Yet
characterizing the Roberts Court as anti-employer based on so
few employment cases would be just as unfair as pigeonholing
the Roberts Court as pro-business with so little perspective.
The Court's employment cases are not the only high-
profile business defeats that complicate the picture of a pro-
business Court. The Chamber lost nearly half the cases that
it participated in during the 2007 Term. Even when
examining one of the Chamber's best terms-the 2006 term
(where the Chamber prevailed in thirteen out of fifteen
cases)-the Chamber lost one of the most controversial
business cases of the Roberts Court thus far-the global
warming case, Massachusetts v. EPA.34 In Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court held that the EPA has the statutory authority
to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles, and
may not refuse to issue emission standards based on policy
considerations not enumerated in the Clean Air Act. The
Chamber believes that the regulation of greenhouse gases
under the Clean Air Act will have a devastating impact on
businesses and on job creation. If the Justices on the
federal labor law preempts key portions of a California statute prohibiting
"certain employers that receive state funds-whether by reimbursement, grant,
contract, use of state property, or pursuant to a state program-from using such
funds to 'assist, promote, or deter union organizing' ").
32. See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008).
Although the Court rejected the Chamber's position that the admission of "me,
too" evidence by non-parties in individual ADEA actions is impermissible, the
Court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that "me, too" evidence is always
admissible.
33. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (addressing the
scope of Title VII's "participation" and "opposition" clauses); CBOCS W., Inc. v.
Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931
(2008); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
34. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
35. See, e.g., Letter from R. Bruce Josten, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to
Chairmen Dingell and Boucher and Ranking Members Barton and Upton,
Comm. on Energy and Fin. (Apr. 9, 2008), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2008080409-co2-regulation_caa.htm.
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Roberts Court really were biased toward business interests,
the Justices wouldn't have reached the result that they did in
Massachusetts v. EPA.
It is also problematic to claim that the Roberts Court
favors business interests merely because a business case ends
up in the "win column" for the business community. The
Court's opinion in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,36 muddies the
claim that a business victory necessarily comes at the
expense of consumers. In Riegel, plaintiff Charles Riegel
sued medical device manufacturer Medtronic in state court
claiming that an FDA-approved balloon catheter was
improperly designed and labeled. By a lopsided 8-1 margin,
the Court held that the express preemption provision in the
Medical Device Amendments Act precluded plaintiffs from
suing medical device manufacturers under state tort laws if
the product had been approved by the federal Food and Drug
Administration.
Although Riegel means that some consumer lawsuits
against device manufacturers will no longer be able to
proceed,37 the opinion reflects a concern for consumer welfare.
In Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion, the Court
stressed that expert regulators are better-suited than juries
to balance the safety risks of a particular medical device
against the potential health benefits of the product. The
Court pointed out that state tort litigation might very well
force life-saving products off the market and thus hurt public
health. From this perspective, Riegel does not reflect either
an anti-consumer or a pro-business bias so much as it reflects
the Court's skepticism of litigation as an effective tool for
regulation and for protecting consumer welfare.3" Claiming
36. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
37. Contrary to the rhetoric of the plaintiffs' bar, it is not true that the
Riegel decision "cuts off access to the courts" for injured consumers. The Court
expressly left the door open for legitimate lawsuits against device
manufacturers whose products fail to meet federal requirements. In Riegel, the
Court clarified that "state requirements are pre-empted under the MDA only to
the extent that they are 'different from, or in addition to' the requirements
imposed by federal law. Thus, §360k does not prevent a State from providing a
damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations." Id. at
1006 (citations omitted).
38. Kenneth Starr has said much the same thing about the Court's recent
decisions, suggesting that the Court is "not so much pro-business as it is
massively skeptical of civil litigation." Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court &
the Business Cases, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 541, 541 (2008).
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Riegel is proof that the Court doesn't care about "injured
people" is at best a cartoon version of the real issues in these
cases.
Riegel is not the only case demonstrating that the
interests of specific plaintiffs often are not co-extensive with
the interests of consumers as a whole. In Credit Suisse First
Boston v. Billing, for example, Justice Breyer warned that
antitrust regulation of securities marketing activity harms
investors by discouraging conduct that the SEC actually
favors. 9 And in Levine, although the majority ultimately
rejected federal preemption of a state failure-to-warn lawsuit
against the drug manufacturer, Justice Breyer wrote a
separate concurrence to stress that "state tort law will
sometimes interfere with the FDA's desire to create a drug
label containing a specific set of cautions and instructions,"
and even noted that "some have argued that state tort law
can sometimes raise prices to the point where those who are
sick are unable to obtain the drugs they need."40
C. Business Victories Are Not the Product of a New
"Conservative Tilt" to the Court
A final common component of the pro-business myth is
that the recent business victories are the product of a new
conservative ideological tilt to the Court. Senator Charles E.
Schumer's recent tirade against the Roberts Court is
emblematic of the claim that the business victories are the
product of a conservative tilt:
[Alt their confirmation hearings, both Roberts and Alito
presented themselves as fair and compassionate, as jurists
39. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 276 (2007) ("[Ihe
activities in question here-the underwriters' efforts jointly to promote and to
sell newly issued securities-is central to the proper functioning of well-
regulated capital markets. The IPO process supports new firms that seek to
raise capital; it helps to spread ownership of those firms broadly among
investors; it directs capital flows in ways that better correspond to the public's
demand for goods and services .... ).
40. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009) (Breyer, J. concurring). If
Justice Breyer's concurrence in Levine sounds familiar, it is because he echoed
the same during oral argument in Warner-Lambert v. Kent, where he suggested
that an expert agency is better equipped to make drug safety decisions than "12
people pulled randomly for a jury roll" who only see the specific plaintiffs
injured by the drug but "don't see those people who need the drug to cure them."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct.
1168 (2008) (No. 06-1498), 2008 WL 495030.
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who would treat the powerful and the powerless equally
before the law. Yet the decisions this term were especially
cruel, advancing the traditional conservative preferences
for the government over criminal defendants and the
interests of business over consumers and employees....
The Court's decisions reflect a seemingly inexorable
instinct to unravel any precedent or torture the language
of a statute or ignore the legal equities that do not
conform to a traditional ultra-conservative ideology.41
Contrary to Senator Schumer's assumption, the outcomes
of business cases are not the product of "traditional
conservative preferences for ... the interests of business over
consumers and employees." In fact, business cases are
remarkably devoid of traditional ideological divides and are
typically decided by lop-sided margins. 42 The Roberts Court
has decided a remarkable seventy-nine percent of the
Chamber's cases43 by a margin of 7-2 or better.44 Compare
that to the Court's overall docket, where only sixty-seven
percent of the cases have been decided by a margin of 7-2 or
better. Even more remarkable, fifty-one percent of the
Chamber's cases have been decided unanimously, or with no
dissenting votes. That's ten percent better than the Roberts
Court's overall average. Given the wide consensus in
business cases, it is difficult to believe that the additions of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are responsible for the
outcomes in these cases.
41. See, e.g., Senator Charles E. Schumer, Keynote Speech to the American
Constitution Society, supra note 5 (emphasis added); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 423 (2007).
42. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 10 (arguing that the Roberts Court's business
decisions are not decided based on traditional ideological criteria; business cases
are decided "in spite of" traditional ideological preferences).
43. During the 2005, 2006, and 2007 Terms. [Is this a complete sentence?]
44. Whether the Chamber wins or loses, the business decisions are decided
by wide margins. The Roberts Court decided eighty-two percent of the
Chamber's defeats by a margin of 7-2 or better, and forty-five percent of the
Chamber's defeats were decided unanimously. The Chamber's victories are
roughly the same-fifty percent of the victories were decided unanimously, and
seventy-five percent of our victories were decided by margins of 7-2 or better.
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Table 2. Decision Margins for Cases Decided by Roberts Court,
2005-2007 Terms
Chamber's Cases Total Docket45
No. of Opinions 45 225
No. of Decisions 7-2 or 34 151
Better
Decisions 7-2 or better (%) 79 67
No. of Unanimous decisions 22 93
Unanimous decisions (%) 51 41
Even when business cases were decided with dissenting
votes, the cases often were not decided along traditional
ideological lines. The liberal justices occasionally found
themselves on opposite sides of business cases-for example,
in the federal preemption case Watters v. Wachovia,46 the
Court divided 5-3 with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing
the opinion in favor of preemption, and Justice John Paul
Stevens opposing preemption in a dissent joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia. The Court's conservative
wing also divided in certain business cases. This was
particularly true in dormant commerce clause cases,
including Department of Revenue v. Davis,47 where Justice
Alito and Justice Anthony Kennedy dissented from the
Court's decision that a tax on out-of-state bondholders'
income but not in-state bondholders' income did not violate
the Commerce Clause; and in United Haulers Ass'n v.
45. Based on data available through SCOTUSBiog: 151 out of 225 cases. In
the 2007 Term, 47 out of 71 cases were decided with two or fewer dissenting
votes. See Posting of Max Schwartz to SCOTUSBIog, http://www.scotusblog.co
m/wp/divisiveness-by-the-numbers-a-look-at-ot-2007/ (June 30, 2008 09:43). In
the 2006 Term, 46 out of 72 cases were decided with two or fewer dissenting
votes. See SCOTUSBIog, End-of-Term, "Super Stat Pack" OT-06, http://www.sc
otusblog.com/movabletype/archives/SuperStatPack.pdf (last visited Apr. 3,
2008). In the 2005 Term, 58 out of 82 cases were decided with two or fewer
dissenting votes. See SCOTUSBiog, Summary Information Regarding the 2005
Term, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/OpinionBreakdownFina
l.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2008). In total, 151 out of 225 cases, or 67%, were
decided with two or fewer dissenting votes. See Memorandum from Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP & SCOTUSBlog on End of Term Statistical
Analysis-October Term 2007 (June 26, 2008), available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/memo07.pdf. Also
according to the term-by-term statistics on SCOTUSBlog, 93 out of 225 cases
were decided unanimously, or 41%. Id.
46. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 500 U.S. 1 (2007).
47. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
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Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,48
where Justice Alito dissented from the Chief Justice's
plurality decision upholding a New York trash processing law
against a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. The
conservative wing divided in other types of cases as well, such
as Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,49 an arbitration
preemption case, where Justice Clarence Thomas was the
lone dissenter to an opinion authored by Justice Alito. Many
of the Court's recent punitive damages decisions follow the
same trend, such as Philip Morris USA v. Williams.50
IV. THE COURT'S RECEPTIVITY TO BUSINESS ARGUMENTS CAN
BE EXPLAINED BY FACTORS OTHER THAN BIAS
I suggest that the Roberts Court's receptivity to business
arguments and broad consensus in business cases can be
explained by the pragmatic values that the Justices seem to
share with one and another. Two key values that seem to
influence the outcomes of business cases are the preference
for a uniform set of legal rules, and for laws and regulations
that produce predictable results. The business community
regularly advances these values in its amicus briefs. Another
possible explanation for the degree of consensus among the
Justices is that most business cases involve questions of
statutory interpretation, which are less controversial than
culturally-charged constitutional cases.
A. The Justices Share the Business Community's Pragmatic
Preference for Uniformity
Most of the Justices appear to share the business
community's preference for uniform legal rules over disparate
and conflicting legal regimes. The recent spate of federal
preemption cases highlights the Chamber and the Court's
shared preference for uniform regulation. The term
"preemption" refers to situations in which federal law
displaces state or local laws. Preemption has its roots in the
48. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330 (2007).
49. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
50. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy, Souter, and
Alito, JJ. Stevens, J., and Thomas, J., filed dissenting opinions. Ginsburg, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined).
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Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which directs
that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."51 Preemption is important to the
preservation of federal laws and policies, to our economy, and
to health and safety; without preemption, thousands of
potential regulators-state legislatures, municipalities,
attorneys' generals and the plaintiffs' bar-would be free to
override federal laws they disagree with, denying protections
that Congress intended to apply throughout the country. The
resulting regulatory balkanization could grind our economy to
a standstill.
The Roberts Court has recognized the practical value of
preemption in several recent rulings. Writing for a
unanimous Court in Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transport Ass'n, 52 Justice Ginsburg warned against the
practical problems that would result if each state were
allowed to set its own interstate shipping rules. In Riegel, the
Court worried that state tort lawsuits against medical device
manufacturers would result in ad hoc, jury-by-jury regulation
of medical devices. The Court explained that a single expert
regulator is far better equipped than a jury to weigh and
balance the health benefits of a particular drug or device,
against the risks of using it.
Even in the non-preemption context, the Court has
demonstrated its preference for a single, uniform regulator.
In Credit Suisse First Boston v. Billing,53 the Court upheld
implied antitrust immunity for companies that are already
heavily regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission.
According to the Court, to permit parallel regulation via
antitrust litigation would result in "lawsuits throughout the
nation in dozens of different courts with different non-expert
judges and different non-expert juries."54 The Court said that
competing regulation by antitrust laws would undermine the
SEC's efforts to regulate business activities, and would have a
chilling effect on a "range of joint conduct that the securities
51. U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
52. Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008).
53. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 127 S. Ct. 2383
(2007).
54. Id. at 2395.
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laws permit and encourage."55
Of course, the Roberts Court preference for uniform rules
is just that: a preference. That preference will not trump the
specific language of an express preemption provision or
always lead to a finding of implied preemption in every
regulatory context. The two preemption cases on the Court's
October 2008 docket-Altria Group, Inc. v. Good56 and Wyeth
v. Levine,5 -amply demonstrate that the Court's preference
for uniform national rules does not always carry the day. It
remains to be seen whether these cases are outliers, reflective
only of the Court's concern over the particular facts of Levine,
and of the specific text of the express preemption provision in
Altria.
B. The Justices Share the Business Community's Concern for
Predictable Legal Rules
Another value driving the outcomes of these cases is
fairness. The Court's recent decision on punitive damages in
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker" is a good example. In Exxon,
the Court reduced an award for punitive damages levied
against Exxon for a now-infamous 1989 oil spill, from $2.5
billion to half-a-billion dollars. The Exxon decision became
the poster child for the Court's alleged preference for big
business interests. Yet the Court hinged its decision to lower
the award on a bedrock principle of the American legal
system: that like cases should be treated alike. According to
Justice David Souter's opinion, "consistency" is an important
component of "fairness." 9 The Court pointed to a large body
of statistical and anecdotal evidence to show that wildly
inconsistent punitive damages awards are the norm rather
than the exception. Justice Souter said that the principal evil
of punitive damages is the "stark unpredictability" caused by
outrageously large outlier awards.6" It was on this basis that
the Court justified limiting punitive damages awards under
federal maritime common law to a much more predictable,
rational 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages.
55. Id. at 2396.
56. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
57. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
58. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
59. Id. at 2625.
60. Id.
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The Court is concerned about predictable legal outcomes
in other contexts, as well. The Court cautioned in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. ,61 that the
expansion of the securities laws to allow liability against
"aiders and abettors" would drive foreign investors away from
American markets due to the "potential for uncertainty and
disruption" by such a cause of action:
The practical consequences of an expansion ... provide a
further reason to reject petitioner's approach. In Blue
Chip, the Court noted that extensive discovery and the
potential for uncertainty and disruption in a lawsuit allow
plaintiffs with weak claims to extort settlements from
innocent companies. Adoption of petitioner's approach
would expose a new class of defendants to these risks....
Overseas firms with no other exposure to our securities
laws could be deterred from doing business here.
62
C. Questions of Statutory Interpretation Are Less
Controversial
While there are still differences among the Justices
concerning issues like how much weight to give legislative
history, there is a broader consensus concerning a text-first
approach to statutory construction than exists concerning the
proper mode of constitutional interpretation. In statutory
cases, the Justices are tasked with picking apart thorny and
often convoluted statutes in order to understand how
Congress intended the statute to function, or what result the
text of the statute would require. The Justices do this with
the full understanding that their interpretations may be
overturned by Congress. The same is not true of
constitutional decisions, where the permanence of the Court's
constitutional conclusions may spark more intense partisan
divisions. Former FDA Chief Counsel Daniel Troy recently
argued that "the Court's text-based approach to interpreting
express preemption provisions provides a pivot point for
securing broad consensus."63 A "text-based approach" may
61. Stoneridge, Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761
(2008).
62. Id. at 772 (citations omitted).
63. Daniel E. Troy & Rebecca K. Wood, Federal Preemption at the Supreme
Court, 9 ENGAGE 7, 13 (2008), httpJ/www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090107_TroyWoo
dEngage93.pdf.
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also provide a "pivot point" for the broad consensus in other
categories of business cases. A remarkable seventy percent of
the Chamber's cases during Chief Justice Roberts' tenure
have addressed questions of statutory interpretation. Of
those, eighty-seven percent were decided by a margin of 7-2
or better, and forty-eight percent were decided unanimously.
Table 3. Chamber of Commerce Cases Involving Statutory
Interpretation Issues
Case
Discrimination
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory
Burlington Northern Santa Fe
v. White
Domino's Pizza v. McDonald
Sprint v. Mendelsohn
FedEx Corp. v. Holowecki
CBOCS West v. Humphries
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp
Securities
Stoneridge Investment
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta
Credit Suisse First Boston v.
Billing
Kircher v. Putnam Funds
Tellabs Inc. v. Makor
Merrill Lynch v. Dabit
Federal Preemption
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transport Co.
Chamber of Commerce v.
Brown
Buckeye Check Cashing v.
Cardegna
Riegel v. Medtronic
Preston v. Ferrer
Citation
128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008)
548 U.S. 53 (2006)
546 U.S. 470 (2006)
128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008)
128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008)
128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008)
550 U.S. 618 (2007)
546 U.S. 500 (2006)
128 S. Ct. 761 (2008)
551 U.S. 264 (2007)
547 U.S. 633 (2006)
551 U.S. 308 (2007)
547 U.S. 71 (2006)
128 S. Ct. 989 (2008)
128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008)
546 U.S. 440 (2006)
128 S. Ct. 999 (2008)
128 S. Ct. 978 (2008)
Vote
7-1
9-0
8-0
9-0
7-2
7-2
5-4
8-0
5-3
7-1
9-0
8-1
8-0
9-0
7-2
7-1
8-1
8-1
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Table 3. Chamber of Commerce Cases Involving Statutory
Interpretation Issues (continued)
Case Citation Vote
ERISA
Sereboffv. MidAtlantic Medical
Services
LaRue v. De Wolff, Boberg and
Assoc.
Beck v. PACE Int'l Union
Metlife v. Glenn
Environment
Envtl. Def. Fund v. Duke
Energy Corp.
United States v. Atlantic
Research
U.S. v. Rapanos
Mass. v. EPA
False Claims Act
Allison Engine v. United States
ex rel Sanders
Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. U.S. ex
rel Stone
Other
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &
Indemnity
IBP v. Alvarez; Turn v. Barber
SafeCo v. Burr
547 U.S. 356 (2006)
128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008)
551 U.S. 96 (2007)
128 S. Ct. 1117 (2008)
549 U.S. 561 (2007)
551 U.S. 128 (2007)
547 U.S. 715 (2006)
549 U.S. 497 (2007)
128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008)
127 S. Ct. 3037 (2007)
128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008)
545 U.S. 1161 (2005)
551 U.S. 47 (2007)
V. CONCLUSION
Through years of experience as a Supreme Court
practitioner on behalf of the business community, I have
learned that efforts to pigeonhole the Court into a tidy
classification such as "pro-business" are generally fruitless.
This is particularly true when one lacks the benefit of
historical perspective, as is the case with the Roberts Court so
far. Time will offer more opportunities to understand the
Roberts Court's take on business issues. In the meantime, it
is important to resist the temptation to paint the Court with
too broad a brush, or to frame business cases as "Wall Street
vs. Main Street."
9-0
9-0
9-0
7-2
9-0
9-0
4-1-4
5-4
9-0
6-2
9-0
9-0
9-0
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In my experience, the Justices do not decide cases with
the dice loaded in favor of"Wall Street." Rather, the Justices
very carefully analyze business-related statutes to
understand what it is Congress intended. They also weigh
pragmatic considerations such as what effect a particular rule
will have on the economy, what are the consequences of
having a patchwork of conflicting rules instead of a uniform
rule, and whether a particular rule is fair and predictable. It
should not be surprising that most of the Justices on the
Roberts Court share all of these values-after all, they are
values that benefit Main Street as much as Wall Street.
When the President and U.S. Senate next have an
opportunity to nominate and confirm a new Supreme Court
Justice, I would hope that they would continue to seek out
candidates who prefer consensus-building over partisanship,
uniformity over balkanization, and who are committed to
predictability in the law.
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